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The recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
cases of Hawke v. Smith' and Rhode Island v. Palmer,2 decide a
number of issues as to the construction of the amending clause of
the United States Constitution. These decisions, therefore, make it
appropriate to review with some fullness the whole procedure for the
amendment of the federal Constitution. The decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Rhode Island v. Palmer is of little value standing
alone. Justice McKenna agreed with the other members of the Court
as to the validity of the- Eighteenth Amendment,.and in the Court's
statement of the grounds for ifs position. Justice McKenna did, how-
ever, think it proper to express a doubt regarding the wisdom of the
Court's action in the Rhode Island Case of announcing merely its
conclusions, without any argument or reasons in support of such con-
clusions, and said that such a policy "will undoubtedly decrease the
literature of the Court if it does not increase its lucidity."
The mere brief statement of conclusions in the Rhode Island de-
cision means little when taken by itself, but some of the points decided
by the Court become clearer if studied in view of the briefs presented
in the cases involving the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment. An
effort will, therefore, be made in this discussion to sum up the points
made by the several briefs, and to indicate the setting of the conclu-
sions expressed by the Court. The case of Hawke v. Smith presents
' (rg2o, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct. 495. The case of Hawke v. Smith is the Court's
pronouncement regarding the application of the state referendum to the federal
amending process.
'(ig2o, U. S.) 4o Sup. Ct. 486. The case here referred to as Rhode Island v.
Palmer is the Supreme Court's decision in seven cases involving the validity of
the Eighteenth Amendment, among them being the cases of Kentucky Distilleries
and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory and Feigenspan v. Bodine, the briefs in which
are referred to below.
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a full review of the issue as to ratification by state legislatures, and
it is, therefore, not so necessary to discuss the briefs in connection with
the decision in this case.
The briefs presented against the validity of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment are addressed more to what the opposing interests thought ought
to be, than to any issues which may properly be termed legal in
character. When read, these briefs in many cases seem to be argu-
ments of counsel who were employed to find arguments, and must,
therefore, do so, even though they knew the arguments to be untenable.
The most effective statements presented to the Court were those sub-
mitted in behalf of a number of states as amici curiae, in the cases of
Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory and Rhode Island
v. Palmer. These briefs bear the name of Mr. Charles E. Hughes.
Perhaps in no case since that involving the validity of the Income
Tax Act of 1894 have historical arguments been so fully employed in
the briefs of counsel as in the cases involving the validity of the
Eighteenth Amendment. Historical arguments based upon the intent
of the framers of the Constitution were frequently urged; and here,
as with reference to other points, those seeking to sustain the Amend-
ment had the better of the argument.
Article 5 of the Constitution provides that:
"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall
call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case,
shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states,
or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode
of ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided, that no
amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight
hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth
clauses in the ninth section of the first Article; and that no state, with-
out its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."
The Constitution provides fwo methods of proposing amendments
and two methods of ratifying amendments, but only one method is
here discussed in detail, because it is the only one as yet employed
for the purpose of altering the Constitution of the United States.
Extent to which the issues were judicially cognizable. In the cases
here under discussion, the contention was first made by those support-
ing the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment that the issues raised
against the Amendment were not judicially cognizable. It was urged
that an amendment having been proposed by Congress, and the
Secretary of State, under the authority of federal law, having certified
that this amendment had been ratified by three-fourths of the states,
the issues as to proposal and ratification were not judicially cognizable;
and that the political nature of the issue was further strengthened
by the fact that Congress had recognized the Eighteenth Amendment
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as a valid part of the Constitution, and had enacted legislation there-
under. It was urged that the issues sought to be presented to the
Court in opposition to the Eighteenth Amendment were issues which
had been presented to and finally passed upon by the political organs
of the United States government. This view is to some extent sup-
ported by Jameson's work on Constitutional Conventions, which sug-
gests that
"when the political power has spoken upon the question, the judicial
department ought, perhaps, in conformity to the general practice of
courts in such cases, to follow its decision."3
On the other side, however, is to be found the unanimous view in
state courts that the question as to whether an amendment to a state
constitution has been properly adopted, is a question for judicial
determination. 4
The statements in the briefs regarding the judicial power to take
cognizance of the issues presented against the validity of the Eight-
eenth Amendment, are not always clear. The brief for the appellees
in the case of Feigenspan v. Bodine, presented by the Solicitor General
of the United States, says that it is competent for the Court to de-
termine whether the procedure laid down by the Constitution has been
complied with; but suggests that the Court must as to certain ques-
tions accept the action of the political departments as conclusive.
This brief says further that the political
"branch having determined that the Eighteenth Amendment has been
ratified, the courts must accept its decision and the judicial function
is merely one of interpretation and application." 5
Mr. Hughes' brief in the Kentucky Distilleries case argues at length
that the question of ratification has been settled by the political depart-
ments of the government 86 On the other hand, Mr. Elihu Root in
the appellant's brief in the case of Feigenspan v. Bodine urged that
the questions were properly cognizable by the Court, and said:
"It would certainly be vain for a constitution to. declare or imply
limitations upon the power to amend it, if those limitations could be
transgressed at will by the very persons who were intended by the
people to be restrained and confined within fixed or prescribedlimits."'7
*J. A. Jameson, A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions (4th ed.) 627. This
work is hereafter referred to as "Jameson."
'A further statement of the development in state courts will be found later
in this paper.
Brief for appellee in Feigenspan v. Bodine, at pp. 3o-32.
Brief for the states in Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company v.
Gregory, at pp. io-2o.
'At p. i28. This brief bears the names of Elihu Root, William D. Guthrie,
Robert Crain, and Bernard Hershkopf. For brevity it is sometimes referred to
hereafter as Mr. Root's brief.
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It may be worth while to review separately the issues which were
being presented to the Court in this case, and to discuss separately
as to each the arguments bearing upon whether such issues were
judicially cognizable. The issues presented to the Court were sub-
stantially the following:
(a) Did two-thirds of both houses propose the amendment, and
what constitutes two-thirds of both houses? It is quite clear that
the Court would not go behind the official record of action by the two
houses in order to determine what the two houses had actually done.
That is, the official record of the action of Congress would be ac-
cepted as conclusive, and no effort to disprove such evidence would
be admitted by the Court. This is not an assertion that an issue may
not be determined by the Court, but is merely a statement as to the
evidence which will be admitted in determining that issue. The real
issue is, did two-thirds propose, and what properly constitutes two-
thirds? This issue, it seems, is clearly one for judicial cognizance,
and the Court in passing upon such an issue is merely determining
the powers of Congress in the same way that it might determine the
powers of the same body to enact legislation. But the proof to be
accepted for the determination of the issue is a different matter, and
the Court would properly decline to permit evidence to contradict
the official records of the two houses.
(b) Is the state's certificate conclusive that there was a proper
state ratification under the terms of the Constitution? Mr. Hughes
said as to this matter that
"twe may assume that the Court would not undertake to go behind
the certificate of the action of the legislature in any state in order to
determine whether in any particular case votes had been cast for or
against the ratification differently from what was disclosed by the
certifying authority.""
The issue as to whether the state's certificate of ratification is con-
clusive divides itself, however, into two parts. One issue is that
as to whether the state's certification received and accepted by the
political organs of the federal government shall be taken as conclu-
sive of what it says. In this case, as in the case of the records of
the two houses of Congress, it may be assumed that the state's cer-
tification should be conclusive evidence of what it says. This, how-
ever, does not decide the second question, which is, assuming the state's
certification to be conclusive of what it says, does the action certified
to amount to a ratification by the state? Mr. Hughes apparently
realized this distinction, and urged that to pass upon this second point
would be to pass upon the structure of the state government, and to
decide an issue political in character.9 However, it does seem that
'Brief for the states in Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company v.
Gregory, at p. 19.
'Ibid.
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the second issue suggested above is properly judicially cognizable,
for there can be no effective ratification by a state except through the
legislature thereof and there appears to be no distinctly political ques-
tion necessarily involved in the determination as to whether the legis-
lature is the representative body or includes the referendum.
(c) A third issue involved is that as to whether the certificate of
the Secretary of State of the United States under power conferred
by statute is itself conclusive of the facts stated in such certificate.
This view was expressly urged in the brief of the Solicitor General
in the Feigenspan Case, where it was said:
"When an amendment has been, therefore, regularly proposed
by Congress, and when the Secretary of State has received official
notice that it has been ratified by the required number of legislatures
and has proclaimed it to be a part of the Constitution, the political
branch of the government has recognized it as a validly adopted
amendment and the courts must follow that decision."' 0
This view, however, seems to be effectively met by Mr. Root's brief
for the appellant in the Feigenspan Case:
"By the express declaration of the Constitution, therefore, only an
amendment which has actually become such in truth and in law is
provided for, and not an amendment which some ministerial or legis-
lative officer believes or declares to have validly become a part of the
Constitution. Thus, an amendment which had been duly ratified by
the legislatures of three-fourths of the states would automatically be-
come part of the Constithtion despite the fact that the Secretary of
State might refuse to announce it, because he erroneously believed the
ratifications to be defective for some reason. No court would hesitate
to disregard his error of law or fact under the circumstances supposed.
Likewise, the action of the Secretary of State in proclaiming that an
amendment was in effect, when it had not yet been ratified by the
requisite number of states, or when it had not yet been ratified by all
the houses of the legislature in the requisite number of states, would
have to be regarded as a nullity. Any other result would mean that
amendments could be made to the Constitution only ifthey won the
approval of the Secretary of State. Such an interpretation of the
fundamental law is plainly erroneous. To refuse an injured party
the right to call the action of the Secretary of State into question in the
courts, would be, to all practical intents and purposes, refusing to up-
hold the Constitution and permitting it to be nullified at will by a
mere ministerial officer."'1
Mr. Root seems clearly correct in his view that it is the ratification
of the states that gives effect to a constitutional amendment and not
the ministerial function of the Secretary of State in certifying such
1 At p. 31.
"At p. x32. In United States v. Colby (ig2o, App. D.C.) 265 Fed. 998, the
court took the view that the statutory duty of the Secretary of State to pro-
claim was purely ministerial; and that the approval of the requisite number of
states, not the proclamation, brought the amendment into effect.
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ratification. The issue here presented seems clearly a cognizable one,
though great weight in its determination should, of course, be given
to the official record of ratification evidenced by the certificate of the
Secretary of State.
(d) The last real issue which was alleged not to be judicially cogniz-
able, was that as to whether Congress had transcended the limits of
the Constitution upon the substantive power of proposing amendments.
There are, of course, certain express limitations upon the subject
matter of amendments which may be proposed, and those opposing
the Eighteenth Amendment also urged that there was a number of
implied limitations as to the same matter. There was some apparent
contention, in support of the Amendment, that the issue so presented
was not judicially cognizable, but the real argument was not so much
that the limitations on the amending power were beyond review by the
Court, as that it would be highly unwise for the Court to extend those
limitations by implication so as to cripple the amending power, and
to give to the Court in each case a determination without guidance of
any rule of law as to whether any amendment might be properly pro-
posed. Those opposing the Amendment were really contending for a
discovery by the Court of broad implied limitations upon the amending
power, running actually into limitations found in the nature of the
government and not at all imposed by the text itself; and those sup-
porting the Amendment took the view that remote implications against
the amending power should not be indulged. That is, those supporting
the Amendment contended that the Court could enforce against the
amending power only the express limitations of the Constitution, and
that it would be unwise and improper to discover implied limitations
upon this power which would commit to the courts in each case the
determination as to the propriety of any amendment, thus forcing
the Court into a field really political in character if it adopted such an
interpretation of the Constitution. So far as the Constitution imposes
limitations upon the subject-matter of proposed amendments, it seems
quite clear that the issue is judicially cognizable, and in order to de-
termine whether Congress had transcended such constitutional limita-
tions, the determination as to what are the limitations imposed by the
Constitution was properly a judicial question.
The discussion here relates merely to the judicial cognizability of
the issue, and later in this paper will be found a discussion of the
limits urged by those opposed to the Eighteenth Amendment and
properly rejected by the Court. The only issue here is that as to the
propriety of the Court's passing upon the issues so presented.
The Court apparently regarded all of the issues suggested above
as judicially cognizable, and its decisions (although one of them, with-
out giving reasons) regarded it as proper for it to determine whether
the constitutional limits upon the amending power had been observed,
and the constitutional methods of proposal and adoption complied with.
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The issue before the Court was, what are the constitutional require-
ments, and it regarded it as proper to determine that issue, although
had it stated reasons, it would probably have limited itself, as indicated
above, to the official evidence for the proof of certain facts to be
established in determining the legal issues presented.
It may be well to trace briefly the growth of judicial control over
the amending process in this country. In Luther v. Borden12 Chief
Justice Taney said:
"Certainly the question which the plaintiff proposed to raise by the
testimony he offered has not heretofore been recognized as a judicial
one in any of the state courts. In forming the constitutions of the
different states after the Declaration of Independence, and in the
various changes and alterations which have since been made, the
political department has always determined whether the proposed
constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people, and the
judicial power has followed its decision."
State v. McBride" was the first case to assert the judicial power to
inquire into the validity of proposed amendments, and here the
amendment was upheld, as also in Green v. Weller and Dayton v.
St. Paul." Miles v. Bradford'5 denied the power. Collier v. Frier-
son"
0 is the only case before i88o in which a state constitutional amend-
ment was declared invalid because improperly adopted. Hardly more
than half a dozen cases involving the proper adoption of proposed
amendments arose before i88o. Up to 189o probably not more than
twenty such cases had come before the courts. Since i89o cases have
frequently arisen and the state courts have exercised an effective
supervision over all steps in the amending process. The brief for the
appellant in the Feigenspan Case 7 suggests that where a court is acting
under a constitution already in force, the court cannot pass upon the
validity of that constitution. The brief for the appellant in the
Kentucky Distilleries Case in reply to the contention that arguments
made against the Eighteenth Amendment would also defeat earlier
amendments judicially recognized as valid, said:
"In response to the argument that the unbroken practice has been to
propose amendments by a two-thirds vote of a quorum, it is sufficient
to observe that inasmuch as all the states, and the people have, for
so many years acquiesced in the amendments it is now too late to
question the validity of the method of their adoption."' 9
(1849, U. S.) 7 How. i, 39. ' (1836) 4 MO. 303.1,856) 32 Miss. 65a; (1876) 22 Minn. 4oo.
15 (1864) 22 Md. i70. See also, Brittle v. People (x872) 2 Neb. I, 214.
(1854) 24 Ala. iooL "At p. 129. 'At P. 30.
Some state cases uphold the view expressed by Mr. Root and Messrs.
Mayer and Bullitt in these briefs. I have discussed the state cases in a book
on the Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions (gio) 86-87, 22-226.
See also, State v. Starling (1867, S. C.) 15 Rich. Law, r2o; and Carpenter v.
Cornish (1gI2) 83 N. J. L. 696, 85 Atl. 24o.
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Assuming that it is within the province of the Court to enforce
the constitutional limitations upon the subject-matter of amendments
and upon the methods of proposing and adopting amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, we may now proceed to discuss what
the limitations are upon both the substantive power and the procedure
of amending the Constitution.
Proposal of amendments by the two houses. In the case of Missouri
Pacific Ry. v. Kansas,20 the Court had before it the question as to
what was a compliance with the constitutional provision requiring a
vote of two-thirds of each house to pass a bill over the President's
veto, and it was held that this provision means two-thirds of a quorum
of each house, and not two-thirds of all the members of that body.
A majority of the members of each house constftutes a quorum. In
considering this question the Court called attention to the identity
between the requirement with respect to the overcoming of a veto
and that authorizing the submission of constitutional amendments.
This issue was, of course, not involved in that case, and it was
vigorously urged in the brief for appellant in the Kentucky Distilleries
Case that the expression of the Court should not be regarded as con-
clusive, but that the slightly different phraseology of the amending
clause should be made the basis for a difference in judicial view.21
This argument was based upon so slight a difference in language as
to be pretty clearly untenable, and the Court adhered to the view pre-
viously expressed, saying in the case of Rhode Island v. Palmer:
"The two-thirds vote in each house which is required- in proposing
an amendment, is a vote of two-thirds of the members present-
assuming the presence of a quorum-and not a vote of two-thirds
of the entire membership, present and absent."
In the decision of the case of Rhode Island v. Palmer, the Court
says:
"The adoption by both houses of Congress, each by a two-thirds vote,
of a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution
sufficiently shows that the proposal was deemed necessary by all who
voted for it. An express declaration that they regarded it as neces-
sary is not essential. None of the resolutions whereby prior amend-
ments were proposed contained such a declaration."
This statement seems unnecessary, and is hardly understandable, ex-
cept as read with the briefs in the cases before the Court. The brief
for the state of Rhode Island22 suggests that the members of the two
" (1919) 248 U. S. 276, 39 Sup. Ct. 93.
' Brief for appellant in Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v. Gregory,
p. 16, et seq.
"At p. 97-08.
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houses voting to propose any amendment must deem the adoption of
that amendment necessary, and this view intimates the possibility of
the Court's being asked to go behind the proposal by the two houses
in order to determine whether the members actually voting for a
proposed amendment thought that the proposal being voted for was
necessary as an amendment to the Constitution. This argument was
discussed by the Solicitor General in the Feigenspan Case,23 and also
by Mr. Hughes in the Kentucky Distilleries Case,24 and the argument
as presented by the state of Rhode Island was shown to be untenable.
The nature of action by Congress and by the states in proposing
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States was fully
discussed in the briefs presented in the Eighteenth Amendment cases,
and there was much argument to the effect that the congressional
function of proposing an amendment and the state function of ratify-
ing are not merely exercises of either national or state legislative
power. As a corollary to the view that the proposal of a constitutional
amendment is not merely a function of ordinary congressional power
as a legislative body, is the view expressed by Justice Chase in the
case of Hollingsworth v. Virginia.25
"The negative of the President applies only to the ordinary cases of
legislation: he has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption
of amendments to the Constitution."
Limitations upon the subject-matter of proposed amendments. The
question most vigorously debated in the briefs presented in the cases
here under discussion, was that as to the limits imposed by the Con-
stitution itself upon the subject matter of proposed amendments.
Article 5 provides
"that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand
eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the first and fourth
clauses in the ninth section of the first Article; and that no state,
without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate."
At pp. 67-70.
"In the Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. brief, at p. 7, Mr. Hughes
answered this contention briefly by saying: "It would seem to be a sufficient
answer to this contention that the adoption of the joint resolution is in itself an
adequate expression by Congress of its judgment in the matter, and that the
Court is not at liberty to assume that Congress in passing a joint resolution
pursuant to the amending power did not deem the proposed amendment to be
necessary."
"(1798, U. S.) 3 Dall. 378. See reference to this statement of Justice Chase
in Hawke v. Smith, supra. A full review of the precedents with respect to the
President's veto power will be found in H. V. Ames, The Proposed Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States during the First Century of Its
History (1897) _9s; and in Jameson, 586-9z Ames' work will be hereafter
referred to merely by the name of the author.
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The Constitution thus contained two express limitations upon things
that might be done by amendment. One of these limitations expired
in i8o8, and the other is still in force.
The prohibition still in force that "no state, without its consent,
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate," appears clear
and definite both in its language and in its purpose. However, it
has been urged that this language imposes a much stricter limitation
upon the amending power than it seems to imply; and much of the ar-
gument implicit in the briefs against the Eighteenth Amendment, seems
to be based upon the notion that either the amending clause or the
Constitution as a whole, when read with the amending clause, sets up
some distinct sphere of state power not subject to alteration by the
amending process.
In an article some years ago in the Harvard Law Review,26 it was
urged that the word "state" as used in Article 5 of the Constitution
means the people of the state having political power, and that an
increase of such people deprives the state of its equal representation
in the Senate. This argument would also deny the validity of the
Woman's Suffrage Amendment. The arguments of this article re-
ceived some support in the congressional debates when the Fifteenth
Amendment was being proposed. An even more remote limitation is
found in the contention recently made that the provision regarding
equal representation guarantees the continued existence of the states,
and that this continued existence implies a continuance of powers in
the states, which may, therefore, not be withdrawn by a federal
amendment having the result of increasing national powers.2 7
Let us turn now from express limitations upon the amending clause
to limitations claimed to be derived from the language of the clause
itself, although not definitely expressed therein. In favor of the in-
terpretation of the amending clause so as to exclude all implied limita-
tions is the argument that the two express exceptions from the
amending power negative the existence of others. The answers to
this argument presented in the several briefs are weak, and seek to
establish limitations not clearly within the language of the Constitution
itself, by strained applications of this language, by remote implications,
or by arguments based upon the nature of the federal system.
One set of arguments is that based upon the construction of the
word "amendment." Judge M. F. Morris 28 suggested some years
ago that:
"Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void? (19o9) 23
HAav. L. REv. i64
"Justin Du Pratt White, Is There an Eighteenth Amendment? (ig2o) 54 Am.
L REv. 245.
"M. F. Morris, The Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution (igog)
189 NORTH Am. REV. 82.
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"Amendment may be made and become effective by a vote of three-
fourths of the states over the objection of the other fourth, or of any
number of the states less than one-fourth. Now, addition is something
entirely new and not germane to the original instrument: amendment
is alteration or improvement of that which in some form is already
there. The distinction between addition and amendment is funda-
mental, and is very clear to every one."
Although Judge Morris' argument is not referred to in any of the
briefs, argument upon this point may be practically regarded as in many
respects an elaboration of the statement quoted above. The argument
that the word "amendment" in itself limits the power of Congress
with respect to the proposal of amendments, is most fully presented
in the brief of the state of Rhode Island, which urges the analogy of
the narrow use of the word in judicial procedure and in parliamentary
practice. The argument of the state of Rhode Island is perhaps
sufficiently summed up in the following quotation:
"The word 'amendment' is a technical word of common law sig-
nificance and means simply 'the correction of an error committed in
a process.' Amendments are thus limited to the correction of errors
committed in the framing of the Constitution." 29
In the brief of the state of Rhode Island a serious effort was also
made to limit the construction of the word through definitions in
dictionaries, and through quotations from debates in the federal Con-
stitutional Convention and in Congress. The appellant's brief in the
Feigenspan Case (which" bears Mr. Root's name) urged also that:
"The word 'amend' has a necessary relation to some particular thing
which is to be amended. The word has no meaning whatever except
in relation to that thing. The change for better or worse which is
called an amendment must be a change in the particular thing amended.
The necessary relation of amendment to the thing to be amended is
ordinarily expressed by the rule that amendments must be germane."3 0
These arguments were fully and effectively answered, both on the
historical and other bases, by Mr. Hughes' briefs in the Rhode Island
and the Kentucky Distilleries cases. Mr. Hughes shows that the word
"amendment" was used generally in the debates and discussions of
the time as equivalent to "alteration," and as permitting any changes
which might be regarded as proper or desirable in the operation of the
government being set up by the Constitution of 178791
The most effective point made against this argument, however, is
that the argument, even if admitted, would accomplish nothing so far
as the Eighteenth Amendment is concerned. The Solicitor General's
brief in the Feigenspan Case expresses the matter clearly when it says:
'At pp. 29, 66 et seq. "At p. 37.
'Brief for the states in Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company v.
Gregory, at p. 41, et seq.; and in State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, at p. x3,
et seq.
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"But this amendment comes clearly within even the narrow definition
suggested, as counsel say the original Constitution granted enlarged
powers to the government and distributed those powers and directed
how they should be exercised, and imposed limitations both upon the
powers granted to the federal government and the powers reserved
to the states. In so far as this amendment confers additional powers
of legislation upon Congress, it follows in the footsteps of the framers
of the Constitution by granting enlarged powers to the federal gov-
ernment. In so far as the powers thus granted are taken from the
states, it merely operates to change the original distribution of
power."32
And the brief correctly adds in its further discussion that:
"In the very nature of things almost any amendment that could be
adopted would take either from the states or the federal government
some of the powers belonging to them respectively."
Mr. Hughes sums up the matter perhaps even more clearly when he
says that
"nothing could be more in consonance with a plan for the amendment
of the constitution than provision for a change in the distribution of
powers, either by subtracting from those conferred upon the federal
government or by taking some part of that which had been reserved
and giving it to the federal government"13 3
Another argument based upon the word "amendment" is that pre-
sented by the appellant's brief in the Feigenspan Case. Here counsel
argued that the Eighteenth Amendment is in effect legislation, in that
it lays down a rule operative upon the states and upon individuals
without the necessity for congressional legislation, and that such an
amendment, being legislation, is not within the express power con-
ferred upon Congress by Article 5 of the Constitution. It will be
well to quote the' language of the brief, which bears Mr. Root's name:
"Our contention is not for a further exception to the power granted;
it is that the grant itself does not include the power of ordinary
legislation. This is no more affected by the fact that there are
express exceptions to the power which was granted than would be
the proposition that the grant of the Fifth Article does not include
the judicial power or power to command the army and navy.'34
The point under contention is made perhaps even dearer by another
statement in this brief:
"In this respect a constitutional amendment granting to the govern-
ment power to prohibit intoxicants would be quite different from an
"At pp. 34, 35 and 48.
"Brief for the states in Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company v.
Gregory, at p. 40.
'At p. 16.
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attempted amendment itself directly declaring the prohibition of in-
toxicants. The former would merely add to the powers of govern-
ment and would, therefore, in this regard at least, be a proper form
of constitutional amendment; while the latter in its essence neither
would add nor withdraw powers of government, but would be direct
legislation. The Eighteenth Amendment is, therefore, in substance
and effect a statute, not a constitutional provision akin to any in the
federal Constitution."
It is sought to bolster up this argument by the provision of the Con-
stitution vesting all legislative power in Congress; and to sustain it
further by the purely political argument that legislation thus em-
bodied in the Constitution becomes permanent and beyond the control
of the majority, because of the fact that change may be prevented by
fourteen states containing only a very small minority of the population
of the country.3 5 A similar argument will be found in an article which
recently appeared in the Harvard Law Review. 36
This argument might be termed somewhat ridiculous, had it not
appeared under the distinguished name of Mr. Elihu Root. The
Solicitor General's brief in the Feigenspan Case reviews a number of
provisions of the original Constitution and of amendments thereto
before the Eighteenth Amendment, and properly says:
"That the provisions referred to are acts of legislation in the sense
that they establish rules of law can not be doubted. They and other
provisions constitute a body of laws which the framers of the Con-
stitution deemed of such importance that they should be enacted and
placed beyond the control of any branch of the government." 37
Mr. Hughes' brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case presents the situa-
tion even more vigorously:
"And what is 'legislation' which is thus said to lie outside the scope
of the amending power according to the theory presented? Is it that
the amendment must not be self-executing? But the obvious answer
is that the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing and it has been so
adjudged by this court ......
"Is it that the amendment must not directly affect the rights of per-
sons without the intervention of legislation? The Thirteenth Amend-
ment did that, for it made free men out of slaves.
"Is it that the amendment must not directly disturb without further
legislation vested rights of property? But the Thirteenth Amend-
ment destroyed property in slaves.
"The attempt is made to explain in some way that the Thirteenth
33pp. II, 14 et seq., 48.
T William L. Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power (1919) 33
HARv. L. REV. 223. See a reply to this article by William L. Frierson, Amending
the Constitution of the United States: A Reply to Mr. Marbury (i92o) 33
H.&Rv. L. Rav. 659. Mr. Frierson's name will also be found signed to the brief
for the appellees in the case of Feigenspan v. Bodine.
I At p. 37.
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Amendment, which did all these things, was not legislation. It is
impossible then to understand in what sense the term "legislation'
is used. For that which establishes a rule of law which, being self-
executing, determines without further legislation the rights and status
of persons and rights of property manifestly has the direct operation
and effect of legislation.
8
Mr. Root's brief refers to the case of State et rel. Halliburton v.
Roach, 9 but does not seek to make much use of this case, and it is
doubtful whether the full facts of the case would have aided the con-
tention being made. The court in the Roach Case took the view that
it was improper to propose by initiative petition an amendment to the
constitution of Missouri providing for the redistricting of the state
for the election of state senators. The original constitution of the
state provided for senatorial districts, but the original provision had
long ceased to be in force because the power to redistrict had, by
other provisions of the constitution, been conferred upon and exer-
cised by the state legislature. The court, by a bare majority, said that
"the petitioners have no right to undertake to put in the constitution,
which is regarded as the organic and permanent law of the state, mere
legislative acts providing for the exercise of certain powers."
The decision was pretty clearly a political one for the purpose of
maintaining an existing apportionment, and there is no satisfactory
authority in support of the view that the court may determine what
the amending power in a state shall place within the text of a state
constitution. The Roach Case is further weakened by the fact that
the language there sought to be embodied in an amendment was of
the same type as provisions which will be found in practically every
constitution framed by a constitutional convention.
For a court to pass upon the propriety of placing a matter in a
constitution, either state or federal (except as expressly provided by
the language of the constitution itself), would deny the people and
the amending process any authority to place in the constitution any-
thing which the court might itself regard as not properly belonging
in the text of a constitution, and would introduce into American con-
stitutional practice a highly undesirable type of judicial control.
In the brief of the state of Rhode Island and in Mr. Root's brief
for appellants in the Feigenspan Case, it is urged that the nature of
MAt pp. SzA52.
(I91o) 23o Mo. 408, 130 S. W. 689. State v. Keith (1869) 63 N. C. 140, and
Eason v. State (1851) 1i Ark. 481, were referred to in the briefs against the
Amendment as sustaining the view sought to be supported also by State ex rel.
Halliburton v. Roach, but these cases do not seem to be capable of such a use.
State v. Keith says that a state constitutional convention is limited by the Con-
stitution of the United States. Eason v. State finds a state constitutional limita-
tion to be applicable in its terms to the legislative proposal of specific state
constitutional amendments.
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the federal system in some manner forbids constitutional amendments
changing the distribution of powers as between the states and the
United States and reducing the states' police power. Mr. Root's brief
sums up this argument as follows:
"There can be no reasonable doubt, that it was contemplated by the
framers, and is implied in the Constitution itself, that the several
states, then existing or thereafter to be created, should be sovereign
and autonomous in their spheres of local self-government. Hence any
amendment which impairs or tends directly to destroy the right and
power of the several states to local self-government should be held
void as in conflict with the intent and spirit and implied limitations
of the federal Constitution adopted by the people of the United
States." 40
A similar view is expressed in the brief of the state of Rhode Island:
"Congress may not constitutionally propose, therefore, nor may the
legislature of a state constitutionally ratify any proposition as an
amendment that involves the exercise or the relinquishment of the
sovereign powers of a state." 1
The historical arguments presented in support of this contention
were poor, and the whole argument is chiefly one that the amending
process is not to be interpreted as unlimited, because if unlimited it
might at some time be unwisely employed. A complete answer will
be found in Mr. Hughes' briefs in the cases of Rhode Island v.
Palmer 2 and Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company v.
Gregory.3
In so far as the contention against the Amendment was based upon
the claim that the national government may not interfere with the
states' police power, it was perhaps sufficiently met by the fact that
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 expressly rejected a proposed
limitation upon the amending clause "that no state shall without its con-
sent be affected in its internal police." Upon principle, however, there
seems to be little, if any, basis for a notion that the state is completely
in the possession of the police power, and that in some manner the
nature of the federal system guarantees this police power of the state
against reduction or impairment. The term "police power" is ordi-
narily employed to define a governmental power to control in a certain
manner, and such a power belongs to the government which may exer-
cise such a type of control. If "police power" is defined as the state's
power to control (and this definition is implied in the briefs against
the Eighteenth Amendment), such power becomes by definition ex-
'*At p. 65.
'At p. i2o. For a full statement of this contention see the brief of the state
of Rhode Island, at p. 37 et seq.
' At p. 34 et seq.
"
3At p. 39. See also, D. 0. McGovney, Is the Eighteenth Amendment Void
Because of Its Contents? (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 499.
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clusively a state power, and does not include similar national powers
of control which result expressly or impliedly from the powers granted
to Congress by the United States Constitution. There is, of course,
no federal police power independently of the things which the Con-
stitution authorizes Congress to do, just as there is no other federal
power independently of the powers conferred by the federal Consti-
tution. The argument that the police power is a state power is merely
a play upon words. General police authority belongs to the state,
because it relates primarily to matters not granted to the United States,
but the general police power of the state yields to federal power
in the same field where the national government has authority to act.
This is not a statement that the police power is exclusively a state power,
for police authority is to a large extent exercised by Congress through
commerce, postal, taxing, and other powers. Clearly there is no im-
plication of any sort that police powers belong exclusively to the states,
and may not be altered by the federal amending power. The argu-
ments frequently made in the briefs that the two governments move
in distinct spheres, and that the federal government has no police
power, have long been untrue, if they were ever well founded. The
argument that the United States has no police power is true only to
the extent that it has no powers except such as are granted to it.
An argument somewhat similar to that just referred to appears fre-
quently throughout the briefs, that certain principles of the Constitu-
tion are unamendable and are to be read as limitations of the amending
article. This view appears frequently in Mr. Root's brief in the
Feigenspan Case. Several quotations from this brief will present his
attitude more clearly:
"It is inconceivable that both the nation and thie states may to all
practical intents have their fundamental characters changed or destroyed
whenever it pleases two-thirds of the houses of Congress, and three-
fourths of the legislatures of the states, which latter may readily
represent only a minority of all the people of the United States. The
possibility of any such outcome should condemn any rule that would
permit it."
And again:
"Thus, the provision guaranteeing due process of law is plainly so
vital to free government that it may not be destroyed, but the provision
against self-incrimination or indictment by a grand jury may well be
regarded as standing on a different footing.""4
Similar to this is the view expressed in several parts of Mr. Root's
brief, and the view expressed by Messrs. Mayer and Bullitt in their
brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case, that the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments became by adoption limitations applicable to all of the
terms of the original Constitution and as such unamendable. The
"At pp..92, 98.
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brief of Messrs. Mayer and Bullitt in the Kentucky Distilleries Case
says that:
"The powers reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are
powers reserved from the operation of Article 5 as well as from the
operation of any other articles of the Constitution."'
5
Mr. George Ticknor Curtis' discussion in his Constitutional History
of the United States appears to be the primary source of these argu-
ments of Mr. Mayer and Mr. Root, and also of the general arguments
based upon the nature of the federal system.
46
The whole argument that the amending process is limited by amend-
ments adopted through such process is sufficiently disposed of by
Mr. Hughes' brief in the case of State of Rhode Island v. Palmer:
"Article 5 itself was not amended. And, not being amended, Article 5
stood as effective with respect to the manner in which future amend-
ments might be obtained as it had been prior to the adoption of the
first ten amendments. These ten amendments themselves, by virtue
of the fact that they were amendments, became part of the Consti-
tution and thus became subject to the amending power contained in
Article 5 equally with any other part of the Constitution."'
7
Appellant's brief in the Feigenspan Case apparently takes the view
that a convention called under the terms of Article 5 of the Con-
stitution would have greater power than Congress has in the proposal
of amendments, although it is difficult to see the basis for such an
argument, because the cohstitutional power conferred is the same as
to the two methods of alteration. In this brief, however, the statement
is made that:
"If fundamental changes become necessary, a convention may be
called on the application of two-thirds of the states for that purpose.
. ... It does not, however, by any means follow that the same unre-
strained power is vested in their governmental agents, that is, in two-
thirds of the houses of Congress and the legislatures of three-fourths
of the states.9'
84
In the case of Rhode Island v. Palmer, the Supreme Court merely
says:
'
5At pp. 13, 15. See also, oral argument of Levy Mayer, at p. i5. The same
views will be found suggested in Mr. Root's brief for the appellant in the Feigen-
span Case, at pp. 91, 92.
4The same line of argument will be found in George D. Skinner, Intrinsic
Limitations on the Power of Constitutional Amendment (I92o) 18 MIcH. L.
REV. 213. A contention somewhat similar in character is that made in the brief
of appellant in the case of Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company v.
Gregory, that the Eighteenth Amendment is subject to the provisions of the
Fifth Amendment. The argument here is not one as to the constitutionality of
the Eighteenth Amendment, however, but is an argument that the Eighteenth
Amendment should be construed as subject to the principle laid down in the Fifth
Amendment.
" At p. 3. 4 At pp. 68, 69.
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"4. The prohibition of the manufacture, sale, transportation, importa-
tion, and exportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, as
embodied in the Eighteenth Amendment, is within the power to amend
reserved by Article 5 of the Constitution.
"5. That Amendment by lawful proposal and ratification has become
a part of the Constitution, and must be respected and given effect the
same as other provisions of that instrument."
In stating these views the Court has necessarily rejected substantially
all of the arguments presented in favor of implied limitations upon
the federal amending power, although its statement does not neces-
sarily go to the extent of denying all limitations other than those
clearly expressed in the constitutional language itself. The Supreme
Court of the United States has at practically all times been liberal in
its construction of national powers, and has been unwilling to adopt
principles by which limitations upon such powers are implied. 49 Every
argument of law and policy favors the view that the Court should not
read into the amending power limitations not within the constitutional
language.
Within the constitutional limits the question as to what amendments
shall be proposed and adopted, either to the federal Constitution or
to state constitutions, is pretty clearly not a proper question for the
courts, but to have construed the word "amendment" in a narrow
manner or to have adopted other implications urged by those opposing
the Eighteenth Amendment, not only would have narrowed the use
of the amending clause, but would have left the question of amend-
ing power in each case to judicial decision without the guidance of
any legal principle. The determination of what was or what was not
an amendment under such a plan would become, just as in the Mis-
souri case of State ex t-el. Halliburton v. Roach, a question which could
be determined only upon the basis of considerations not clearly legal
in character. The Solicitor General's brief in the Feigenspan Case was
clearly right, both in law and in fact, when it said that
"the Congress itself and the ratifying legislatures have been made thejudges of whether a proposed amendment is germane and their
decision is final." 50
This does not mean in any way that the Court may not pass upon the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, but it does mean that the
Court properly took the view that no implications should be con-
structed by which a court itself should decide upon the propriety of
each proposed amendment.
Another valid objection to such a broad view as that urged by those
opposed to the Eighteenth Amendment is well expressed by Mr.
Hughes in his brief in the Rhode Island Case:
'"See article on Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional
Law (i919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 137.
0At p. 42.
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"Such restrictions, established by judicial decree, could not be re-
moved by any process of constitutional amendment which the Con-
stitution affords. As such restrictions would affect the power of
amendment, they could not be eliminated by amendment. They would
remain unalterable except by the Court itself unless in some manner
a new constitution were adopted outside the exercise of amending
power contained in the present Constitution."'
This view of Mr. Hughes is reiterated in the brief which he presented
in the case of the Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company,
where he again urges that judicial constructions have always been
open to change through constitutional amendment, but that for the
Court to limit the amending power itself would constitute a con-
stitutional change beyond the reach of popular control.
52
Ratification by state legislatures. Another important question in
connection with the amending process is that as to the power of Con-
gress to regulate the exercise of this power. The amending power
conferred by Article 5 of the Constitution is pretty dearly a power
vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States,
and Congress has authority "to make all laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper" for the exercise of such a power. The power is
one belonging to the government of the United States, of which the
states are a part for the purpose of ratification. It is clear, there-
fore, that Congress has the authority to enact such legislation as that
of 1818, making it the duty of the Secretary of State to cause amend-
ments to be promulgated whenever official notice has been received
that proposed amendments have been adopted in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
In proposing the Eighteenth A-mendment, Congress provided that
the amendment should be "inoperative unless it shall have been rati-
fied as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the
several states as provided in the Constitution within seven years from
the date of the submission hereof to the states by the Congress." No
constitutional objections to the Eighteenth Amendment were urged
because of this provision, although in i919 a proposed constitutional
amendment was favorably reported upon in the United States Senate
which limited the ratification of federal amendments to "six years
from the date of their proposal." This amendment had been pro-
posed by Senator Brandegee, and the need for the amendment was
suggested by Senators Brandegee, Ashurst, and Borah, on the
ground that a congressional limitation of this type was probably
unconstitutional. 8
" At p. 30. "At pp. 39-4.
=Cong. Rec. (66th Cong., ist sess.) 5694-57oo; id. (65th Cong., 2d sess.) 477;
id. (65th Cong., ist sess.) 5556-5558. Senator Borah suggested the probable
unconstitutionality also of the provision that the amendment if adopted should
become operative one year after its ratification.
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It would seem that congressional legislation may properly be en-
acted limiting to a reasonable period after submission the power to
ratify a proposed amendment to the federal Constitution. Jameson,
however, took the opposite view and said:
"No power is granted to prescribe conditions as to the time within
which the amendments are to be ratified, and hence to do so wouldbe to transcend the power given. The practice of Congress in such
cases has always conformed to the implied limitations of theConstitution. 54
Jameson's statement of fact correctly applies to all constitutional
amendments proposed before the Eighteenth Amendment. Jameson,
however, did take the view that some limitation is desirable, and
suggested that a constitutional amendment. for the purpose be adopted.
Even if Congress were not constitutionally empowered to impose such
a limitation, it is probable that the courts would almost of necessity
take the view that the proposal of an amendment without an express
limitation of time does not keep such proposal indefinitely before the
states. In 1873, the senate of Ohio adopted a joint resolution ratify-
ing the second of the twelve amendments submitted to the states by
Congress in 1789.'5 In 1789 the states numbered thirteen; in 1873
they numbered thirty-eight. It is quite certain that a sufficient number
of states would not begin ratifying in 1873 to cause the adoption of
an amendment proposed in 1789, but the situation presented is not
altogether satisfactory in character.
The Eighteenth Amendment placed in the text of the amendment
itself the language postponing its application to one year after ratifi-
cation thereof, and also the language providing that ratification must
take place within seven years from the date of submission. It is clearly
a proper part of a constitutional amendment to prescribe when it shall
take effect, although it is more doubtful whether the provisions of a
proposed amendment should contain conditions as to the ratification
of that amendment. Clearly if Congress has no power to impose
a limit upon the period of ratification, it would have no power to accom-
plish the same purpose by embodying such a limitation in the pro-
posal itself, so that the state legislatures must either accept the
limitation or decline to ratify. However, it is believed that Congress
has constitutional power to impose a time limitation upon the ratifica-
tion of amendments.
The power to fix a time limit within which an amendment shall be
ratified is not the same as a power to recall an amendment when once
it has been submitted. The function of the two houses of Congress
is that of submitting an amendment, and when they have done this
their power with respect to that amendment may be said to be functus
officio. Power has then passed from Congress to the states, and a
Jameson, 634. Jameson, 635; Ames, 29.
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reconsideration by Congress at a later period may not destroy the
action which states may have already taken, or prevent subsequent
state action.
To what extent may Congress regulate the procedure of state
legislatures in passing upon a proposed constitutional amendment?
The state legislatures in passing upon a constitutional amendment may
properly be said to act as organs of the national government rather
than as state agencies, and if a congressional regulation were neces-
sary and proper, it could be enacted. However, it is clear that the
state legislatures are not subject to congressional control as to what
they shall do. In 1866 when the Fourteenth Amendment was under
consideration in the United States Senate a resolution was proposed
that this amendment should be submitted to legislatures which should
be chosen, or the members of the most popular branch of which should
be chosen, next after the submission of the amendment, at the first
session thereof. Several other proposals of a similar character were
presented but such proposals were defeated, largely on the ground that
they were in violation of the United States Constitution. In 1869 a
resolution was proposed in the United States Senate prescribing the
rules to be followed by state legislatures in passing upon constitutional
amendments." It is probably beyond the power of Congrc'-s to de-
termine the dates upon which such legislatures shall consider pro-
posed constitutional amendments, or to prescribe the requisite vote in
a state legislature for the ratifications of a proposed amendment.
These were the things attempted by the Senate proposals of 1869.
Clearly no federal legislation may impose conditions or restrictions
upon the method of ratification by state legislatures, although the period
within which ratifications may be had is probably within congressional
control. A reasoxlable limitation upon the period for ratification may
be appropriate as an incident to the purely congressional power of
proposing amendments, although it to some extent restricts the com-
plete freedom of state ratification; but it does not restrict the free
will of the state legislature in acting on the proposal, or limit the
state's determination as to the organization of its representative legis-
lature. The act of ratifying is a federal function, but the legislature
doing the act is the state legislature.
Upon the subject of state ratification, the question most vigorously
argued in the recent Eighteenth Amendment cases was that as to
what are "state legislatures." The argument was vigorously urged
that the term "legislatures" as used in Article 5 of the Constitution
signifies "not solely the legislative assembly of a state, but the re-
pository of legislative power therein." 57 The same view was urged
in the brief of appellant in the Kentucky Distilleries Case, where it is
suggested that "clearly it was intended that the ratification should
"Ames, 287-29r.
" Brief for appellant in Feigenspan v. Bodine, at p. x12.
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be by the legislative power of the states as distinguished from the
judicial and executive." In view of this argument it was urged that
in the states where a referendum had been adopted, such referendum
was one means of exercising legislative power and might be made ap-
plicable to federal constitutional amendments. It was said that this
referendum constituted a part of the state ratifying machinery. Mr.
Root's brief went so far as to suggest that if a state had once adopted
a referendum, this referendum became a part of the state legislature,
and that if the state had not made such a referendum applicable to
federal, amendments, there existed no legislative power in the state
capable of action upon such proposed amendments. 9 This view is
perhaps logical, for if a state had adopted the referendum, and if the
referendum were to be treated as a part of the state legislature, it is
difficult to see how there could be state legislative ratification without
the possibility of using the referendum. If the referendum in its
terms were therefore not applicable to federal amendments, Mr. Root
might logically urge that there was no authority in that state capable
of ratifying a federal amendment.
The arguments for an interpretation of the word "legislature" so
as to include "referendum," were effectively met by Mr. Hughes's
brief in the Kentucky Distilleries Case. Mr. Hughes properly calls
attention to the fact that proposals for popular ratification of federal
amendments were actually made in i861 and 1869, and that the term
"legislature" as used in the constitution is in all cases employed as
relating to a representative body.59 He might have added further
that the Constitution by its terms provides for ratification either by
state legislatures or by conventions in the several states, and that both
methods clearly contemplate action through representative bodies
rather than through popular voting.
Attention may perhaps properly be called to the fact that in recent
years, a number of proposals have been made for the ratification of
federal constitutional amendments by popular vote in the several
states, and in i919 a proposal was debated in the United States Senate
which provided that Congress might specify ratification by electors in
the several states as an alternative to ratification by legislatures or by
conventions."
In the case of Hawke v. Smith, the Supreme Court settled the issue
as to what constitutes the "legislature" of a state for the purpose of
ratification. The court said:
"The only question really for determination is: What did the framers
of the Constitution mean in requiring ratifications by 'legislatures'?
That was not a term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the
"Brief for appellant in Feigenspan v. Bodine, at pp. 115-17.
"At pp. 24-34.Cong. Rec. (66th Cong., ist sess.) 5694-57oo. For a review of earlier efforts
to obtain ratifications by popular vote, see Ames, 293-294.
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Constitution. What it meant when adopted it still means for the
purpose of interpretation. A legislature was then the representative
body which made the laws of the people. The term is often used in
the Constitution with this evident meaning. Article I, section 2,
prescribes the qualifications of electors of Congressmen as 'those
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legis-
lature.' Article I, section 3, provided that Senators shall be chosen in
each state by the legislature thereof, and this was the method of
choosing Senators until the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment,
which made provision for the election of Senators by vote of the people,
the electors to have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the state legislature. That Congress and the
states understood that this election by the people was entirely dis-
tinct from legislative action is shown by the provision of the amend-
ment giving the legislature of any state the power to authorize the
executive to make temporary appointments until the people shall fill
the vacancies by election. It was never suggested so far as we are
aware, that the purpose of making the office of Senator elective by
the people could be accomplished by a referendum vote. The necessity
of the amendment to accomplish the purpose of popular election is
shown in the adoption of the amendment. In Article IV the United
States is required to protect every state against domestic violence
upon application of the legislature, or the executive when the
legislature cannot be convened. Article VI requires the members of
the several legislatures to be bound by oath, or affirmation, to support
the Constitution of the United States. By Article I, section 8, Congress
is given exclusive jurisdiction over all places purchased by the consent
of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be. Article IV,
section 3, provides that no new states shall be carved out of old states
without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned.
"There can be no question that the framers of the Constitution
clearly understood and carefully used the terms in which that instru-.
ment referred to the action of the legislatures 6f the States. When
they intended that direct action by the people should be had they were
no less accurate in the use of apt phraseology to carry out such pur-
pose. The members of the House of Representatives were required
to be chosen by the people of the several states. Article I, section 2.
"It is true that the power to legislate in the enactment of the laws
of a state is derived from the people of the state. But the power to
ratify a proposed amendment to the federal Constitution has its source
in the federal Constitution. The act of ratification by the state derives
its authority from the federal Constitution to which the state and its
people have alike assented.. . . Any other view might lead to endless
confusion in the manner of ratification of federal amendments. The
choice of means of ratification was wisely withheld from conflicting
action in the several states." 61
' The Court readily distinguished the view in this case from that taken in
State of Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant (1916) 241 U. S. 565, 36 Sup. Ct. 708.
See also Ex parte Dillon (ig2o, N. D. Calif.) 262 Fed. 563; and article by
W. H. Taft, Can Ratification of an Amendment to the Constitution Be Made to
Depend on a Referendum? (i92o) 29 YAE LAW JOURNAL, 821. In view of the
decision of the United States Supreme Court regarding state referenda upon
proposed amendments to the federal Constitution, little attention need be given
to the decisions of state courts with respect to the application of the state
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The case of Hawke v. Smith arose under an Ohio constitutional
amendment which expressly provides that the action of the legisla-
ture in ratifying a proposed federal amendment shall be subject-to the
referendum. The Court said as to such a state requirement:
"The argument to support the power of the state to require the ap-proval by the people of the state of the ratification of amendments
to the federal Constitution through the medium of a referendum rests
upon the proposition that the federalConstitution requires ratificationby the legislative action of the states through the medium provided at
the time of the proposed approval of an amendment. This argumentis fallacious in this-ratification by a state of a constitutional amend-
ment is not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the word. Itis but the expression of the assent of the state to a proposed amend-
ment."
The view taken by the Court clearly makes it improper for a state
constitution to impose limitations upon the exercise by the legislature
of its power to ratify a federal constitutional amendment. If a state
may not require a referendum, nor impose conditions upon the exer-
cise of the power of the state legislature as a federal agency, clearly
there is no power in the state to impose the condition now found in
the constitution of Missouri that "the legislature is not authorized
to adopt nor will the people of this state ever assent to any amendment
or change of the Constitution of the United States which may in any
wise impair the right of local self-government belonging to the
people of this state.""2  Clearly, also, a state constitution has no
authority to impose the limitations found in the constitutions of Florida
and Tennessee, that no convention or legislature of the state shall
act upon any amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
unless such convention or legislature shall have been elected after the
amendment is submitted63
It should be remembered, however, that ratification is by state
legislatures, and that although the state may not provide any other
referendum to federal amendments. Decisions holding state referenda applicable
to the federal amending process are Hawke v. Smith (i939, Ohio) z26 N. E. 400(reversed by the United States Supreme Court); State v. Howell (i919, Wash.)
181 Pac. 92o; State v. Amsberry (igig, D. C. Lancaster County, Neb.) ; Carson
v. Sullivan (9ig9, C. C. Cole County, Mo.). A contrary view as to the state
referendum was taken in the Opinion of the Justices (i91g, Me.) 3o7 AtI. 673;.
Herbring v. Brown (I939) 92 Ore. x76, i8o Pac. 328; Whittemore v. Terral
(I919, Ark.) 215 S. W. 686; Prior v. Noland (i9ao, Colo.) 188 Pac. 729;
Barlotti vi. Lyons (I92o, Calif.) 189 Pac. 28; and Decher v. Vaughan (92o,Mich.) i77 N. W. 388. State v. Morris (Ig2o, 0ka.) 19I Pac. 364, and Carson
v. Sullivan (192o, Mo.) 19i Pac. 57i, were decided after the decision of Hawke
v. Smith in the Supreme Court. Ohio was the only state having a constitutional
provision expressly providing for the use of the referendum upon proposed
federal amendments.-
Const. of Mo. (1875) Art. A sec. 3.
Const. of Fla. (i885) Art. 16, sec. i9; Const. of Tenn. (I870) Art. 2, sec. 32.
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.method of ratification or impose limitations upon the power to ratify,
it does seem to be dearly within the power of the state through its
constitution or otherwise to determine what shall be the organization
of the state's representative legislative body, and what shall be the
quorum for action by that body. It, of course, also rests within the
power of the state itself as to when regular or special sessions of the
state's representative body shall meet, and as to how that representa-
tive body shall be organized. The brief for appellant in the Kentucky
Distilleries Case urged that the states by abolishing a representative
legislative body might destroy the possibility of future amendments
to the Constitution, except so far as ratification may be provided by
conventions. This argument is based upon too remote a possibility
to have much weight, and even assuming that representative state
legislatures should disappear, the federal amending process would still
be capable of effective operation through congressional provision for
ratification by conventions in the several states.
An issue which presents itself with respect to state ratifications is
that as to whether the governor has any veto power over the state
legislative action in this regard. It has already been suggested that
the President of the United States has no power to disapprove the
action of Congress in proposing constitutional amendments to the
states, and this view is taken because the proposal of constitutional
amendments is not regarded as a regular function of legislation, the
Constitution prescribing it as a different process to be exercised in a
different manner. The same view applies with respect to the gov-
ernor's power of vetoing the state legislative ratification of a federal
amendment. The state legislature here is not acting as a state legis-
lative body under the terms of the state constitution, but is, in the clear
view expressed by the Supreme Court, acting as an agent of the
national government in the performance of a function specified by
the Constitution of the United States. The governor has, by the
terms of the federal Constitution, no share in this function. The
governor of New Hampshire vetoed the resolution of the legislature
of that state ratifying the Twelfth Amendment, but as the vote of the
state was not needed to make up the three-fourths vote required for
the ratification of the amendment, no issue seems to have been made
about the matter." When the legislature of the state of Kentucky
rejected the Thirteenth Amendment, the resolution was presented to
the governor of that state. The governor, although disagreeing with
the legislative action, merely transmitted the action of the general
assembly to the federal authorities. 5 When the income tax amend-
ment was pending, Mr. Hughes, who was then governor of New York,
sent a message to the legislature of that state recommending that the
amendment be not approved, but nothing in the circumstances indi-
cated any view upon his part that he had any negative power over
Ames, 297. ' Ames, 297; Jameson, 63o.
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such action as might be taken by the legislature. In the state of
Arkansas, the legislative action ratifying the income tax amendment
was submitted to the governor and was vetoed by him. The action
of the legislature was, however, transmitted to the Secretary of State
of the United States, and Arkansas was properly counted as one of
the states ratifying that amendment.66
What constitutes ratification by a state? Clearly a constitutional
amendment is submitted to the state without conditions, and no state
can ratify conditionally. Such a ratification is merely equivalent to
a rejection or failure to ratify.
The question has presented itself several times as to whether a
state which has once ratified may withdraw its ratification of a federal
amendment. The states of New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon, after
giving their consent to the Fourteenth Amendment, -sought to with-
draw this consent ;7 and the state of New York sought to withdraw
its consent to the Fifteenth Amendment."3 Jameson takes the view,
and the view is incontrovertible, that a state, once having ratified,
may not withdraw that ratification. He suggests tat to construe the
Constitution otherwise, would be to permit great confusion in that no
state in ratifying could know what the status of the amendment was
if at the same time other states were permitted to withdraw. Of
course, confusion would occur also in that it would be difficult to
know when three-fourths of the states had ratified. Clearly, no state
could be permitted to withdraw after three-fourths had ratified and
adhered to their ratification. The function of ratification seems to be
one which, when once done, is fully completed, and leaves no power
whatever in the hands of the state legislature. This is the view taken
in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Secretary of State of the United States
issued a certificatd in which he declared the amendment adopted, pro-
vided the ratifications of New Jersey and Ohio were to be considered
as still valid. On the following day a concurrent resolution was passed
by Congress pronouncing the ratification of the amendment valid and
sufficient." As Jameson says, Congress has definitely taken the view
in this instance that a state once having ratified may not withdraw
its ratification of a federal amendment. This view seems clearly a
correct one. The recent action in Tennessee on the woman suffrage
amendment presents the latest case of an attempt to withdraw
ratification.
" The Department of State has on several other occasions taken the view
that the governor has no power with respect to the state's ratification. In .all
of the states in which the issue has arisen, the view has been taken that the
proposal of state constitutional amendments is not subject to the veto power
of the governor. See discussion in my book, The Revision and Amendment of
State Constitutions (igxo) I48-I5z.
'"The state of Oregon did not withdraw her consent until after the adoption
of the amendment.
"Ames, 299; Jameson, 63r. Jameson, 628.633.
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On the other band, it is perhaps clear that a state legislature has a
continuing power of ratification until an amendment is adopted, 
or
until such a long period has elapsed that a sort of statute of limitations
may be said to have run against any power to ratify the proposal.
It may be remembered that the power in the state legislature is 
one
derived from the federal Constitution, and is a power to ratify, 
not a
power to reject. If a constitutional amendment is proposed, one state
legislative session may not by explicitly rejecting prevent the further
exercise of the federal power conferred upon the state legislature.
Rejection by a state legislature is in this respect equivalent to the
negative result arising from state legislative inaction. There is no
power in and of itself to reject a federal constitutional amendment,
and failure to act by one-fourth of the states is sufficient. In the
case of the Thirteenth Amendment, New Jersey first rejected the
amendment and then ratified. In the case of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, four states (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and
Virginia) rejected and then ratified. In the case of the Fifteenth
Amendment, Ohio and New Jersey rejected and then ratified. In all
of these cases, where the action was taken previous to the issuance
of the proclamation that an amendment had been adopted, the states
were included by the Secretary of State as ratifying.
07
The question presented itself in connection with the adoption of
the Thirteenth Amendment as to what constitutes three-fourths of
the states. Several of the states counted in the ratification of that
amendment had not been readmitted to representation in Congress,
and a question was raised as to whether they could give valid assent to
an amendment. In the case of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments ratification by a sufficient number of states was obtained by
requiring approval of one or both of the amendments as a condition
precedent to the admission of representatives to the federal Congress,
from the states which had recently been in rebellion.
When an amendment is pending for some time before it obtains
ratification, the number of states may have increased, and it is quite
clear that three-fourths of the number at the time of ratification is
required, rather than three-fourths at the time of the proposal of the
amendment. The ratification must be by three-fourths of the state
legislatures, and such a ratification could not be had unless at the
time of final adoption of the amendment three-fourth? of the states
then in the Union had agreed thereto. Jameson suggests a difficulty
in the counting of three-fourths which would present itself were a state
permitted to withdraw after it has once ratified an amendment. This
difficulty might present itself when nearly three-fourths had ratified,
for a campaign to obtain withdrawals of ratification might leave a
proposed amendment in suspense even though a state had ratified,
which would be sufficient to make the three-fourths had another
"Ames, 3oo; Jameson, 629630.
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state not withdrawn. However, as has already been indicated, it is
clear that a state may not withdraw its ratification.
The case of Hawke v. Smith lays down clearly the principle that
the whole power of proposing and ratifying amendments to theConstitution of the United States has its source in that instrument.
The states have no independent power with respect to the matter,
except so far as it is expressed in the federal Constitution, and
Congress has no power except so far as power is necessary and
proper to carry out the authority so conferred.
In this discussion only incidental attention has been paid to the
possible use of conventions for the amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. Congress has authority to call a convention
on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, and
a number of states have in particular instances passed resolutions
asking that such a convention be called. The issue of calling a
federal constitutional convention has, however, not seriously pre-
sented itself.71 Efforts have several times been made to have pro-
posed constitutional amendments submitted to conventions in the
several states instead of to state legislatures, but such efforts have
been unsuccessful.72 A curious case of convention ratification was
the ratification of the so-called Corwin amendment, proposed inI86i, by the state constitutional convention in Illinois in 1862. This
amendment was proposed by Congress to the state legislatures, and a
convention assembled for the purpose of revising a state constitution
had no authority whatever to pass upon the proposed amendment, but
the issue as to its action never presented itself, because the proposal
received little attention.
Operation of the federal amending clause. Affirmatively, it is clear
that the federal amending clause makes necessary the concurrence in
sentiment both of the states and of the population of the states, in
order to adopt an amendment to the Constitution. After an amend-
ment is once proposed by the two houses of Congress, three-fourths
of the states, having less than one-half of the population, may ratify
such an amendment, but clearly sufficient protection is accorded to
population by the requirement of two-thirds of the members of the
House of Representatives to propose an amendment, and a further
protection is 'accorded to the states by the requirement of a two-
thirds vote by the Senate. It is true, of .course, that the two-thirds of
each house required is but two-thirds of a quorum, and that an
amendment might actually be approved by the House of Repre-
sentatives through the action of members representing a minority
of the people of the country, but in case of any issue in which the




larger states might be arrayed against the smaller, it may well be
expected that all members of both houses would be present when so
important a matter as a federal amendment is to be voted upon.
Looking at the matter from a negative standpoint, however, it is
clear that a small number of smaller states may prevent an amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, and that without any
union among the smaller states for such a purpose a proposed amend-
ment may be defeated, although it has in its favor a distinct pre-
ponderance of opinion not only in a majority of the states, but also
upon the part of the great majority of the people of the country.
The senators from one more than one-third of the states may prevent
the proposal of a federal constitutional amendment, and this fact places
a negative upon such proposal in the hands of seventeen states, which
might represent a very small proportion of the population of the
country.7 3 After an amendment is once proposed, a small group of
states has power more completely in its hands, for the ratification of
an amendment may be prevented by thirteen states. Upon the basis
of this fact, it was urgently contended in the briefs opposed to the
Eighteenth Amendment that the prohibition of traffic in liquors was
a matter of temporary or legislative policy being placed in the Con-
stitution, and that placing it in the Constitution established a permanent
control over this matter by a minority, inasmuch as more than one-
third of the members of the House and Senate could prevent any
proposal of amendment to change the existing policy, and thirteen
out of forty-eight states could prevent the ratification of any such
change. It is true, of course, that less than ten per cent of the popula-
tion of the United States, living in thirteen states, may control the
issue as to whether a constitutional change shall be made, but since
the adoption of the federal Constitution there has never been a definite
alignment in this country of the smaller states against the larger, and
there is no likelihood that the smaller states will so unite. So, also,
if the larger states had a greater power in the proposal and ratification
of amendments, there would be practically no possibility of all the
larger states, distributed as they are in different parts of the country,
uniting against the states of smaller population, which are also
so distributed.
As a matter of fact, it may be said that there is greater practical
difficulty in obtaining the proposal of amendments than in obtaining
their ratification. The four amendments proposed in recent years
were ratified without material delay. Professor H. V. Ames pub-
lished in 1897 a complete review of the proposed amendments to the
federal Constitution during the hundred year period from 1789 to
1889. During this period fifteen amendments were adopted; band
Since the popular election of United States Senators, Senators cannot be
said to represent the state as a political organization quite as distinctly as they
did when elected by state representative bodies.
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four other amendments were proposed by Congress to the states for
ratification, but not adopted. The proposed amendments not adopted
related to the apportionment of representatives (proposed in 1789) ;
compensation of members of Congress (proposed in 1789) ; titles of
nobility (proposed in i8io) ; and, a proposal prohibiting the abolition
of slavery (proposed in 1861). The proposal in 1861 came too late
in the slavery struggle to receive any favorable action by the states:
Two of the four proposals which failed of ratification (that on appor-
tionment of representatives and that on titles of nobility), failed of
adoption by only one state's ratification. During the same period
eighteen proposed amendments were approved by one house but not
by the other, nine by the Senate and nine by the House of Repre-
sentatives. Since 1889 each amendment proposed by the two houses
of Congress has been ratified by the states; but a number proposed
by one house has failed in the other. Proposals for the popular
election of Senators were a number of times agreed on by the House of
Representatives but not by the Senate, before the final proposal of this
amendment. It may be true, of course, and probably is, that many
proposed amendments have failed in the two houses because of the
knowledge that ratification by the states would be difficult if not im-
possible, but so far as the facts indicate, ratification of the amendments
proposed has been less difficult than has been the proposal of amend-
ments by the two houses.74
For years it has been contended with some show of reason that the
federal amending process is too difficult.7 5 Proposals for the altera-
tion and simplication of the amending process have been frequently
made. A review of such proposals down through the year 1889 will
be found in Ames' work on Proposed Anendments to the Constitution
of the United States during the First Century of Its History,7 and in
an unpublished continuation of Ames' study prepared by Jacob Tanger
of Pennsylvania State College.
It may be worth while to review briefly the more important changes
suggested in the federal amending process. Professor J. W. Burgess
in his Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, published
in 1893, suggested that a plan be adopted as follows: "Proposal of
amendments by two successive Congresses, Senators and Representa-
tives acting in joint assembly and resolving by simple majority vote;
submission of proposals to the legislatures of the several states, these
again acting in joint assembly and resolving by simple majority vote;
assignment to each state of the same weight in the count of votes as in
"Ames, 300.
"See Ames, 30o et seq; Munroe Smith, Shall We Make Our Constitution
Flexible? (igi) x94 NoPRTH AM. REv. 657; J. David Thompson, The Amendment




a presidential election, and ratification of amendments by a simple
majority of the state votes thus weighted." Professor Munroe Smith
has suggested a plan somewhat different from this, as follows: "Pro-
posal of amendments by the majority vote of' both houses in two suc-
cessive Congresses; submission of such proposals to the legislatures
of the several states or to conventions in the several states or directly
to the voters in each of the states, as one or another of these modes of
ratification may be proposed by Congress; and ratification of pro-
posals by a majority of the states, provided that the ratifying states
contain, according to the last preceding enumeration, a majority of the
total population of all the states." Both of these plans diminish the
apparent control by states, as such, over the amending process; but
as has already been said, the participation of the states, as such, is really
unnecessary for the protection of either the large or the small states.
Both of these plans give, of course, a much greater degree of power to
the states with the larger populations. The proposal of Professor
Burgess leaves no decisive control even to a majority of the states, and
departs materially from the federal principle in our system of govern-
ment. The plan suggested by Professor Munroe Smith preserves the
federal principle more completely, by providing not only for a separate
vote in the Senate, but also by providing that the ratification of a pro-
posed amendment shall be by a majority of the states as well as by a
majority of the total population.
The more important general proposals recently made for a change in
the method of amending the federal Constitution, are those of Senators
Cummins, La Follette, and Owen. Senator Cummins proposed, in
1913, that there be added to the present amending article of the Con-
stitution the following language:
"Whenever the legislatures of sixteen states shall adopt resolutions
proposing any amendment, and the same are certified to the President
of the United States, or whenever fifteen per centum of the voters in
twenty-four states present to the President petitions authenticated by
the respective governors of the said states proposing any amendment,
the President shall submit the same to the several states, and in either
case any such amendment shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a
part of the Constitution when ratified by two-thirds of the several states
acting either by direct vote of the people or by the legislatures, as may
be determined'by state law: Provided, that no state, without its con-
sent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."
An adverse report upon this proposal was submitted by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary in 1914, and a minority report presented
by seven members of the committee urged that an easier method of
amendment was desirable, although only two members (Senators Cum-
mins and Ashurst) agreed in approving Senator Cummins' proposal.
The proposal introduced in 1913 by Senator La Follette reads as
follows:
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"The Congress, whenever a majority of both houses shall propose
amendments to this Constitution, or on the application of the legisla-
tures of ten states, or on the application of ten states through the vote
of a majority of the electors of each, voting upon the question of such
application, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, to be sub-
mitted for ratification in each of the several states to the electors quali-
fied to vote for the election of Representatives. And the vote shall be
taken at the next ensuing election of Representatives in such manner as
the Congress may prescribe. And if in a majority of the states a ma-
jority of the electors voting thereon approve any proposed amendment,
and if a majority of all the electors voting thereon also approve any
proposed amendment, it shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part
of this Constitution."
In this form Senator La Follette's proposal is merely an addition to
Article 5 of the Constitution.
Senator Owen has several times proposed in Congress a plan by
which a majority of the members of both houses may propose amend-
ments, or by which either house alone may propose an amendment if
the other twice rejects the proposal. He would also permit proposal
upon application of a majority of the state legislatures. For ratifica-
tion, his proposal adopts the plan of submission to the voters directly,
and adoption, if ratified by a majority of the voters, provided the
amendment also receives a favorable vote in a majority of the con-
gressional districts. This plan (just as that of Professor Burgess)
to a large extent disregards the federal principle in the proposal and
adoption of constitutional amendments.
In connection with proposals which attempt to reduce materially the
share of Senators in the proposal of constitutional amendments, or
which tend (as do the Burgess and Owen proposals) to destroy the
equal share of each state in the proposal of amendments, the question
presents itself as to whether there may not be a violation of the limita-
tion that no state without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suf-
frage in the Senate.
The proposals referred to above contemplate a substantial change
in the whole procedure for the amendment of the federal Constitution.
Comment should properly be made regarding proposals which do not
seek to go quite so far. Senator Brandegee has several times intro-
duced a proposed amendment which permits Congress to submit an
amendment for ratification either to the state legislatures or to state
conventions, or to the electors in the several states. Senator Brande-
gee's proposal, which has been twice unanimously reported by the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, also limits state ratifications to
six years from the date of the proposal of an amendment. 7 Mr.
Seba Eldridge has for a number of years been urging a change
in the federal amending process by which the question of calling a
" Cong. Rec. (66th Cong., ist sess.) 5694-57oo.
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federal constitutional convention should be submitted each twenty years
to the voters of the several states. This plan is copied from that in
force in some states by which the question of calling a state constitu-
tional convention is submitted at periodical intervals.
7 8
A few years ago it was thought that the difficulties of amending the
federal Constitution were insurmountable except in times of grave
crises. Ten amendments had been added to the Constitution almost
immediately after the federal government went into operation, but
these amendments might really be termed a supplement to the original
Constitution. The Eleventh and Twelfth Amendments were adopted
without great difficulty. Then followed a period of more than sixty
years (I804-I865) in which no amendment to the Constitution was pro-
posed and ratified. The three war amendments were adopted in the
short period between I865 and 187o, but their adoption came as a result
of a grave national crisis, and the ratification of these amendments by
the states was obtained in part by methods not available in ordinary
times, and perhaps not appropriate at any time.
However, at the present time the difficulties of federal amendment
do not appear quite so great as they did a few years ago, because of
the fact that since i9o9 four amendments have been ratified. In the
briefs against the Eighteenth Amendment, efforts were made to have
the Supreme Court adopt further limitations upon the federal amend-
ing process than those clearly appearing in the Constitution itself,
and the Court was urged to take such a view largely on account of
the great dangers urged as existing now because of an easy amending
process, but it did not take the view of those seeking to destroy the Pro-
hibition Amendment.
The arguments for a more restricted amending process than that
now appearing in the express language of the Constitution were, of
course, arguments for the purpose of sustaining a particular view in
order to destroy, if possible, the establishment of federal prohibition
in the Constitution. These arguments should, therefore, not be treated
too seriously.
However, it is true that the view as to the difficulty of amending the
federal Constitution is now quite different from the view which existed
ten or twelve years ago. This changed attitude has, to some extent,
made the federal amending process easier, for a part of the difficulty,
at least before the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, was due to
the feeling that the amending machinery was unworkable rather than
to the unworkability of that machinery. It should on the other hand
New Hampshire requires a vote of this character each seven years; Iowa
each ten years; Michigan each sixteen years; Maryland, New York, and Ohio
each twenty years. The Oklahoma constitution leaves to the legislature the
discretion as to when such a question shall be submitted to the people, but
requires the question to be submitted at least once in every twenty years.
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be borne in mind that the four amendments proposed in recent years
have all been ones which involved neither political nor sectional issues.
Moreover, all of these amendments have related to matters as to which,
at the time of submission, a generally favorable view had been reached.
This statement may be contradicted with respect to the Eighteenth
Amendment regarding federal prohibition, but the statement here made
relates to the view existing at the time of proposal and ratification, and
not to any views which may develop as a result of dissatisfaction with
the Amendment in its actual operation.
A serious question presents itself as to whether the federal amend-
ing process should be so easy as to permit the introduction into the
Constitution of provisions which involve distinctly sectional or politi-
cal issues. Clearly the federal Constitution performs a function dif-
ferent from that of the state constitutions, and should be less flexible
than the state constitutions may properly be. The function of the
federal Constitution is primarily that of drawing a line between national
and state powers, and such a line should not be subject to frequent
variations. It is true, of course, that the inflexibility of the federal
Constitution has thrown upon the courts a greater burden than they
would otherwise have had, and the courts have to a large extent, by
construction, enlarged the powers once conferred upon the federal gov-
ernment. However, this judicial enlargement comes gradually, and
the United States Supreme Court, in its function of preserving the
balance between national and state powers, has on the whole per-
formed its service efficiently and in a statesmanlike manner. The
federal amending process should be easier, but in bringing about a
change in the federal Constitution or in any other constitution, two
elements must unite: (a) the sentiment of the people in favor of
change, and particularly in favor of the specific change being urged;
and (b) operation of the machinery for the purpose of effecting such
a change. A real change in the federal amending process has already
been accomplished through a change in the first of the two elements
just referred to, in that the view has been broken down that the present
amending machinery is substantially unworkable. The machinery
itself may still need to be changed, but in changing it attention should
be given to the peculiar function of the federal Constitution, and no
change should be made of such a character as to bring about constant
agitation for a change of the boundaries between national and state
powers, and a frequent shifting of the line drawn by the Constitution
between national and state authority in this country.
